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1 Introduction
The European Police Office (Europol) is the European Union (EU) law enforcement 
organisation that handles criminal intelligence. Its aim is to improve the effectiveness 
and cooperation between the competent authorities in the Member States in preven-
ting and combating serious forms of international crime. Europol was not established 
to deal with local or minor offences, but to give a European dimension to the inves-
tigation of crime of a European dimension (Klip, 2009). The list of Europol-crimes 
has become longer over the years. The Europol Council Decision further extends 
the competence of Europol, as the existence of an organised criminal structure is no 
longer a limiting element (dorn, 2009). The forms of crime over which Europol has 
competence are to be assessed by the competent national authorities in accordance 
with the national law of the Member States to which they belong. This often leads 
to the result that the competence of Europol is being interpreted in different ways 
throughout the EU. It has already been suggested for the sake of coherence to rely 
on uniform definitions for so-called ‘EU core crimes’ that would also fall within the 
competence of bodies and agencies dealing with security related issues (e.g. Europol, 
Eurojust, Frontex) (vermeulen, 2002).
In two parts and a conclusion, this contribution will elaborate on the overall-ques-
tion: How to shape the competence of Europol? The latter also in comparative perspective, 
by looking at the United States (US). Two research methods are combined throughout 
this contribution: a study of relevant literature and a critical analysis of relevant legal 
and policy documents, including the very latest.
The first part is devoted to the competence of Europol. The first section (2.1) intro-
duces Europol and identifies three ‘eras’ for further analysis. In the second section 
(2.2) the extension of the competence of Europol is analysed for the pre-Convention 
era (2.2.1), the Convention era (2.2.2) and the post-Convention era (2.2.3). Our main 
questions are: Was there a trigger to extend the competence of Europol time and again? Was 
there a genuine ‘need’ to do so? In the third section (2.3) the definition of the competence 
of Europol is examined, or rather the non-existence of definitions of Europol-crimes 
(2.3.1). We ask ourselves the question: What could fill the absence of definitions of Europol-
crimes? (2.3.2). The first part is used as a steppingstone for the second, comparative 
part. We compare EU law enforcement organisation Europol to its US counterpart, the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The only comparisons between Europol and the 
FBI that have been carried out so far mainly concern executive powers (ellerman, 2002 
& 2005), leading to the conclusion that Europol is in no way a European equivalent of 
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the FBI (bruGGeman, 2000; corsTens & pradel, 2002), although the role of Europol in 
joint investigation teams could be a foretaste of an executive European Police Office 
(de moor, 2009). The question of competence ratione materiae has hardly ever been 
raised, whereas a comparison in this respect could be very useful for the Europol-case. 
The first section (3.1) introduces the FBI with its dual responsibility for law enforce-
ment and national security. The second section (3.2) deals with the competence of the 
FBI, which is responsible for more than 200 categories of federal crime. How is the 
competence of the FBI defined? is our main question. First some basic constitutional 
features of the US criminal justice system are given (3.2.1). Then the federalisation 
of criminal law is examined (3.2.2), as the extension of the competence of the FBI 
and the extension of federal criminal law go hand in hand. Mirroring the first part, 
both the extension (3.2.3) and the definition (3.2.4) of the competence of the FBI are 
covered.
2 The Competence of Europol
2.1 Introducing: Europol
The EU was originally established largely to promote the economic integration of its 
Member States. Economic integration, however, brought with it new opportunities for 
criminals, above all the ease with which they could cross national borders. Because 
crime was perceived to be organised increasingly at a European level, politicians agreed 
that an organisation was needed that could coordinate national law enforcement 
resources to effectively tackle crime on a pan-European level (Haberfeld, mcdonald & 
von Hassell, 2008). The acknowledged forerunner of Europol was the intergovernmen-
tal cooperation under the umbrella of TREVI (Terrorism, Radicalism, Extremism and 
International Violence), which took place in the margins of the European Community 
from the mid seventies until the early nineties (fiJnauT, 1992; anderson et al., 1995; 
peeK, 1998). To the attentive observer it came as no surprise when Germany proposed 
at the Luxembourg European Council of 28-29 June 1991 the creation of a European 
Criminal Investigation Office (fiJnauT, 1994). This had always been the dream of 
former German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, who was in fact promoting the idea of a 
European Federal Police, modelled after the American FBI. Half a year later, at the 
European Council of 9-10 December 1991 in Maastricht, a modified proposal was 
formally adopted that a European Police Office (Europol) should be recognised under 
the new Justice and Home Affairs Title (JHA) of the equally new Treaty on European 
Union (TEU) (bunyan, 1993).
The TEU was signed in Maastricht on 7 February 1992 (OJ C 191 of 29.7.1992). 
It entered into force on 1 November 1993 and marked a new step in the European 
integration. The Treaty of Maastricht, which established the European Union (EU), 
divided EU policies into three main areas, referred to as ‘pillars’. The supranational 
first pillar (European Communities) was complemented by the intergovernmental 
second (Common Foreign and Security Policy) and third (Cooperation in the Fields of 
Justice and Home Affairs) pillars (Guild, 1998). Article K. 1 TEU, the core provision 
of Title VI (Provisions on Cooperation in the Fields of Justice and Home Affairs) pro-
vided that Member States would consider as a matter of common interest: “9. police 
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cooperation for the purposes of preventing and combating terrorism, unlawful drug 
trafficking and other serious forms of crime, including if necessary certain aspects of 
customs cooperation, in connection with the organization of a Union-wide system for 
exchanging information within a European Police Office (Europol)”. In this provision 
there was no question of the assignment of executive powers to Europol (woodward, 
1994; bruGGeman, 1996). It has to be noted that it was not until the Council adopted 
the Joint Action of 10 March 1995 (OJ L 62 of 20.3.1995) that Europol – or rather its 
predecessor the Europol Drugs Unit (EDU) – was formally housed in the third pillar.
The initial legal basis of the EDU was the Ministerial Agreement on the establish-
ment of the Europol Drugs Unit, signed in Copenhagen on 2 July 1993 (bunyan, 1997). 
The TREVI-Ministers had in fact agreed on a step-by-step creation of Europol, begin-
ning with a drugs intelligence unit, which would then be further developed. From 
1995 to 1999 the EDU acted as a non-operational team for the exchange and analysis 
of information and intelligence, as soon as two or more Member States were affected, 
in relation to inter alia illicit drug trafficking, together with the criminal organisa-
tions involved and the associated money-laundering activities (monaco, 1995). The 
objective of the EDU was to help the police and other competent agencies within 
and between Member States to combat these criminal activities more effectively. The 
Member States’ liaison officers and the EDU analysts joined forces in The Hague (NL). 
The essential feature of the EDU was the fact that no personal information could be 
centrally stored, whether automatically or otherwise. Europol replaced the EDU on 
1 July 1999.
The Europol Convention (OJ L 62 of 20.3.1995) was signed on 26 July 1995, to 
enter into force on 1 October 1998, after its adoption by the Member States in accord-
ance with their respective constitutional requirements. However, it was not until 1 
July 1999, following a number of legal acts related to the Europol Convention, that 
Europol commenced its full activities as the EU law enforcement organisation. Yet 
again, no executive powers. This also showed from the declaration on the police which 
is annexed to the Europol Convention and which only mentions databases, support 
of the national investigations, analysis of information, the development of preventive 
strategies… (bruGGeman, 1997).
Under the Europol Convention, the organisation was made competent to support 
law enforcement action against a whole ‘shopping list’ of crimes, where an organised 
criminal structure is involved and two or more Member States are affected (infra). 
Europol’s core task is to support the competent authorities in the Member States 
(mainly police forces, immigration and customs authorities) in their intelligence 
work. In addition to the facilitation of exchange of information and the development 
of criminal intelligence, Europol can assist with advice and training. The backbone of 
Europol is its computerized system of collected information consisting of an infor-
mation system (IS), analytical work files (AWFs) and an index system. The national 
unit situated within each Member State liaises between Europol and the competent 
national authorities. Europol liaison officers are seconded by their national unit to 
represent the interests of the latter within Europol.
The Treaty of Amsterdam of 2 October 1997 (OJ C 325 of 24.12.2002) brought 
a new dimension to cooperation in the fields of justice and home affairs. With the 
gradual transfer of policy on asylum, migration and judicial cooperation in civil 
matters from the third to the first pillar, Title VI of the TEU was renamed “Provisions 
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on police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters”. The aspirations were wider, as 
it was now the Union’s objective “to provide citizens with a high level of safety within 
an area of freedom, security and justice” (Article 29, § 1 TEU). This objective should 
be achieved through “closer cooperation between police forces, customs authorities 
and other competent authorities in the Member States, both directly and through the 
European Police Office (Europol) in accordance with the provisions of Articles 30 and 
32” (Article 29, § 2, first indent TEU). Article 30. 1 TEU emphasised the importance 
of operational cooperation between the competent law enforcement authorities in the 
Member States. Europol also sees its role of information broker confirmed. In addi-
tion, Article 30. 2 TEU foresaw new tasks for Europol. In any case, there was again no 
question of the assignment of executive powers to Europol (Zanders, 1999).
Within a period of five years after the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam 
(1 May 1999 – 1 May 2004), Europol had to be enabled to facilitate and support the 
preparation, and to encourage the coordination and carrying out, of specific investiga-
tive actions by the competent authorities of the Member States, including operational 
actions of joint teams comprising representatives of Europol in a support capacity. 
Moreover, Europol had to be enabled to ask the competent authorities of the Member 
States to conduct and coordinate their investigations in specific cases (scHalKen & 
pronK, 2002). In November 2002 a Protocol amending the Europol Convention in this 
sense was adopted, adding “participation in a support capacity in joint investigation 
teams” and “making requests to initiate criminal investigations” to the principal – 
information-related – tasks of Europol (OJ C 312 of 16.12.2002).
However, by the time the JIT Protocol – and two other amending Protocols (2000, 
2003, infra) – finally entered into force (spring 2007), a Commission Proposal to replace 
the Convention with a Council Decision was already on the negotiating table of the 
Council of Ministers (COM (2006) 817 of 20.12.2006). The Europol Council Decision 
(OJ L 121 of 15.5.2009) was formally adopted by the JHA Council of 6 April 2009. 
Europol’s change of status – from intergovernmental organisation to Community 
agency as from 1 January 2010 – is aimed at improving its operational and administra-
tive functioning (de moor & vermeulen, 2010; Genson & buyssens, 2009; Toxopeus & 
bruGGeman, 2009).
On the basis of this introduction, three ‘eras’ can be distinguished, for each of 
which we examine the competence of Europol more closely (2.2): the pre-Convention 
era (2.2.1), the Convention era (2.2.2) and the post-Convention era (2.2.3). Our main 
questions are: Was there a trigger to extend the competence of Europol time and again? Was 
there a genuine ‘need’ to do so?
2.2 Extending the competence of Europol
2.2.1 The pre-Convention era
As the blueprint for the EU began to take shape from the mid eighties, drugs became 
the primary rationale for a new security agenda based on the argument that the 
abolition of internal border controls would cause an explosive growth in drug traffick-
ing (elvins, 1999). This argument has been remarkably influential, despite an almost 
total lack of supporting evidence or research (benyon et al., 1993). Drug trafficking also 
provided the primary rationale for Europol during the pre-Convention era.
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The EDU, which formed the nucleus of Europol, kicked off in the 1993 Ministerial 
Agreement with competence for illicit drug trafficking, the criminal organisations 
involved and associated money laundering activities affecting two or more Member 
States. Drug trafficking was too important an issue to ignore. A new organisation like 
Europol could not possibly stay away from drugs. However, it was envisaged from the 
outset that Europol would not be a single mission agency (verbruGGen, 1995). The 
confinement to drug-related crime and money laundering was seen to hamper the 
EDU (bruGGeman, 1996).
In anticipation of a Europol Convention, about which agreement could not be 
reached at that time, the Essen European Council of 9-10 December 1994 decided to 
extend the EDU’s initial competence to the fight against illegal trade in radioactive and 
nuclear materials, crimes involving clandestine immigration networks, illegal vehicle 
trafficking and associated money-laundering operations. Although the extension was 
formalised in the 1995 Joint Action, the fact that in the absence of agreement on a 
Europol Convention, the EDU had been set to work with an extended competence on 
the mere basis of legally non-binding agreements among Ministers was described as 
unsatisfactory (House of lords, 1995; Klip, 1995).
The 1995 Joint Action was equally controversial. At a stroke the remit of the EDU 
had been extended from one area of crime to four, without any reference to the 
European or national parliaments and without any motivation whatsoever. It was a 
move described by EDU/Europol Director Storbeck as “a legally and politically relative 
simple extension of the ministerial agreement” (bunyan, 1995, p. 4). The House of 
Lords noted in its 1995 report that “the crimes within the initial competence reflect 
preoccupations of several Member States and appear on the list not because they are 
the most serious offences but because they are particularly transnational in character” 
(House of lords, 1995, p. 26).
From crimes involving clandestine immigration networks to trafficking in human 
beings proved to be a small step. A domestic scandal1 severely influenced the debate 
and served as catalyst to speed up the decision making process (locHer, 2007). During 
the informal JHA Council of 26-27 September 1996 Belgium put forward three initia-
tives concerning trafficking in human beings and sexual exploitation of children. The 
Irish Presidency took over the lead with a motion to extend the competence of the 
EDU (flynn, 1998). After formal approval from the 28-29 November JHA Council, a 
Joint Action extending the competence of the EDU to trafficking in human beings was 
adopted on 16 December 1996 (OJ L 342 of 31.12.1996). For the definition of traffick-
ing the Joint Action referred to the Europol Convention, which after much delay and 
redrafting had been signed, but had not yet entered into force at that time (infra).
The Joint Action bore in mind the wish of the European Parliament. In its Resolution 
of 18 January 1996 on trafficking in human beings (OJ C 32 of 5.2.1996) the European 
Parliament had hit a nerve, referring to the abolition of border controls in an internal 
area without frontiers in which persons – including human traffickers – are entitled to 
freedom of movement. Therefore, compensatory measures of police cooperation were 
1 In the summer of 1996, Belgium had been confronted with the Dutroux case, which revealed that 
young girls had been kidnapped, sexually abused and subsequently killed, and which raised suspi-
cion about the activity in Belgium of (international) paedophile networks, involved in trafficking in 
children, inter alia for the purpose of sexual exploitation and exploitation of children in pornographic 
performances and materials.
GOFS 4.indd   67 15-01-2010   16:24:38
Topical issues in eu and inTernaTional crime conTrol
68 Maklu 
also to be applied to trafficking in human beings as a serious form of international 
crime. Yet, under the Treaty of Maastricht trafficking in human beings – unlike drug 
trafficking – was not explicitly mentioned in Article K. 1 TEU.
2.2.2 The Convention era
The Europol Convention was drawn up in secret by members of the Working Group 
on Europol comprised of interior ministry officials and police officers. The European 
Parliament was not consulted under the Treaty of Maastricht at any stage during the 
two years of negotiations over the Convention’s content, although Article K. 6 TEU 
explicitly stated that the Council should “consult” the European Parliament “on the 
principal aspects of activities” to ensure its “views” are “duly taken into consideration” 
(bunyan, 1995). This, many Members of Parliament believed, was reminiscent of the 
pre-TEU days when negotiations were carried out by a small group of bureaucratic 
elites behind closed doors (flynn, 1998).
Initial delays in the drafting of the Europol Convention were related precisely to 
unresolved dilemmas about Europol’s sphere of competence (den boer, 1995). The list 
of crimes capable of being brought within the competence of Europol was expanded 
greatly between the initial drafts and the final text of the Europol Convention. Europol 
would initially act to prevent and combat unlawful drug trafficking, trafficking in 
nuclear and radioactive substances, illegal immigrant smuggling, trade in human 
beings and motor vehicle crime (Article 2. 2, § 1 Europol Convention). This cor-
responded to the extended competence of the EDU. Within two years at the latest 
following the entry into force of the Convention, Europol would also deal with crimes 
(likely to be) committed in the course of terrorist activities. The reference to terrorism 
while it was included in the Maastricht Treaty (Article K. 1 TEU), was not included in 
the first drafts of the Convention. It was added at the insistence of Spain and Greece, 
two Member States with domestic terrorism. The two-year waiting period was a 
compromise, allowing Europol to have a warming up period in less stormy waters 
(verbruGGen, 1995).
The Council could also decide to instruct Europol to deal with other forms of crime 
listed in the Annex to the Convention. The list included 18 other serious forms of 
international crime, divided into three categories. The first category covers crimes 
against life, limb or personal freedom (murder, grievous bodily injury; illicit trade in 
human organs and tissue; kidnapping, illegal restraint and hostage taking; racism and 
xenophobia). The second category clusters crimes against property or public goods 
including fraud (illicit trafficking in cultural goods, including antiquities and works 
of art; swindling and fraud; racketeering and extortion; counterfeiting and product 
piracy; forgery of administrative documents and trafficking therein; forgery of money 
and means of payment; computer crime; corruption). The third category bundles 
illegal trading and harm to the environment (illicit trafficking in arms, ammunition 
and explosives; in endangered animal species; in endangered plant species and varie-
ties; in hormonal substances and other growth promoters; environmental crime). The 
Standing Committee of Experts on International Immigration, Refugee and Criminal 
law (Meijers Committee) told the House of Lords the list of crimes was arbitrary and 
argued for an objective standard (House of lords, 1995). Europol’s competence also 
extended to the related illegal money laundering activities and the related criminal 
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offences. The concept of related offences was added between November 1994 and July 
1995 (bunyan, 1995).
All the Europol-crimes must satisfy three criteria, equally defining the com-
petence of Europol (Article 2. 1 Europol Convention). As a first criterion, there 
should be factual indications that an organised criminal structure is involved. The 
Europol Convention leaves this notion entirely undefined (infra). Nevertheless, in the 
Convention era organised crime became the primary rationale for Europol (GreGory, 
1998). The use – and misuse – of the notion ‘organised crime’ is well known and 
well documented (See den boer, 2002). The second criterion requires two or more 
Member States to be “affected” by the forms of crime in question. It could be that 
two or more Member States are confronted with a criminal phenomenon. It could 
also be that they are simply involved in any way (Zanders, 1999). Based on this broad 
interpretation a cross-border element would then not be a prerequisite. The second 
criterion is not even sufficient, the crimes should also justify a common approach by 
the Member States owing to their scale, significance and consequences. This third 
criterion is nothing but an application of the principle of subsidiarity to the Europol-
case. It is the principle, defined in the Treaty establishing the European Community 
(TEC) (OJ C 325 of 24.12.2002), whereby the Union does not take action (except in the 
areas which fall within its exclusive competence) unless it is more effective than action 
taken at national, regional or local level. When a criminal phenomenon or a criminal 
organisation can be tackled more adequately at the European level, this calls for police 
cooperation through Europol. The mere fact, however, that forms of crime are brought 
within Europol’s remit does not warrant a common approach as such, even more so, 
now the list of Europol-crimes has become longer over the years and remains largely 
undefined (infra).
The Europol Convention had established an order of priority, which was disturbed 
at a number of occasions. The extension to terrorism was the first example. The two-
year waiting period (supra) tested the patience of Spain. This had everything to do with 
the fact that the entry into force of the Europol Convention took longer than expected. 
Spain once again began to push for a more rapid inclusion of terrorism within the 
remit of Europol (occipinTi, 2003). The Council Act of 3 December 1998 (OJ C 26 of 
30.01.1999) instructed Europol to deal with “crimes (likely to be) committed in the 
course of terrorist activities against life, limb, personal freedom or property”, as from 
the date of taking up its activities (1 July 1999) (lavranos, 2003).
A Council Decision of 29 April 1999 (OJ C 149 of 28.05.1999) further extended 
Europol’s competence to deal with forgery of money and means of payment, one of the 
crimes listed in the Annex (supra). The trigger for yet another extension was the intro-
duction of the euro2. With the euro replacing the national currencies of the Member 
States the traditional (counter) argument of national sovereignty played to a lesser 
extent. In 2001 Europol and the European Central Bank even signed a strategic coop-
eration agreement, at the occasion of which Europol Director Storbeck said “organised 
crime was attracted by the idea of counterfeiting one of the two largest currencies in 
the world” (europol, 2001).
2 The euro (€) is the official currency of 16 of the 27 Member States of the EU. The euro was introduced 
to world financial markets as an accounting currency on 1 January 1999. Euro coins and banknotes 
entered circulation on 1 January 2002. 
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At its meeting on 15-16 October 1999 in Tampere, the European Council had called 
for special action against money laundering, which was seen to be at the very heart of 
organised crime (Document SN 200/1/99 REV 1). The Council was invited to extend 
the competence of Europol to money laundering in general (Tampere Milestone 
Nr. 56). In June 2000 the Portuguese Presidency introduced an initiative to this end 
(Council document 9426/00 of 26.6.2000). In November 2000 the first of three Protocols 
amending the Europol Convention was adopted. The so-called ‘Money Laundering 
Protocol’ (OJ C 358 of 13.12.2000) extended Europol’s competence to money launder-
ing, regardless of the type of offence from which the laundered proceeds originate.
Instead of a further incremental extension of Europol’s competence (terrorism, 
forgery of money and means of payment, money laundering), the entire Annex was 
now brought within Europol’s sphere of competence. The motivation for this expo-
nential extension was that criminals obviously ignored Europol’s competence (sic). 
Information concerning types of crime that fall outside the competence – to the extent 
it reached Europol at all – was to be regarded as excess information and as such unus-
able. Europol’s support to police authorities in the Member States was consequently 
impaired (Council document 5134/01 of 9.1.2001). The extension did not require 
amendments to the Europol Convention, but a Council Decision. The discussions 
within Council structures did however show a number of Member States in favour 
of an amendment of the Europol Convention, making Europol competent for inter-
national organised crime in general, without limiting the competence of Europol to 
an enumeration of forms of crime (Council document 11282/01 of 31.7.2001). The 
initial draft Council Decision of the Swedish Presidency (Council document 6876/01 
of 8.3.2001) became a joint Belgo-Swedish initiative (Council document 9092/01 of 
11.6.2001). The negotiations from the Europol Working Party (EWP) over the Article 36 
Committee (CATS) to the Permanent Representatives Committee (COREPER) led to a 
political agreement by the JHA-Council of 27-28 September 2002 (Council documents 
9093/2/01 of 5.9.2001; 9093/3/01 of 13.9.2001; 9093/4/01 of 20.9.2001; 9093/5/01 
of 14.11.2001) and a formal adoption on the Council Decision of 6 December 2001 
extending Europol’s competence to deal with the serious forms of international crime 
listed in Annex to the Europol Convention (OJ C 362 of 18.12.2001).
Halfway the Convention era the list of Europol-crimes had taken its final form. 
However, there remained room for manoeuvre with the first criterion defining the 
competence of Europol (supra). The Danish Initiative of 2002 proposed the deletion of 
the criterion that an organised criminal structure should be involved (Council docu-
ment 10307/02 of 2.7.2002). The Europol Joint Supervisory Body (JSB) understood that 
practice had shown that some forms of serious crime did not fulfil this criterion. Its 
deletion would then prevent “that Europol is not competent in serious criminal cases 
that fulfil all the elements of serious international crime but lack a criminal structure. 
The serial rapist who victimises persons in different Member States but is not part of a 
criminal structure should be subject of the involvement of Europol in the joint efforts 
to stop him” (JSB, 2002, p. 4). The Danish Initiative also repealed the enumeration of 
specific crimes, claiming there was a need to extend Europol’s competence to serious 
international crime in general (Council document 10810/2 of 10.7.2002) (supra). The 
Danish Protocol of November 2003 (OJ C 2 of 6.1.2004) was less far-reaching eventu-
ally, only adding “reasonable grounds” to the factual indications that an organised 
criminal structure is involved and leaving the list of Europol-crimes intact (flocH, 
GOFS 4.indd   70 15-01-2010   16:24:38
2e proef (c) Maklu
sHapinG THe compeTence of europol. an fbi perspecTive 
Maklu 71
2003). Nevertheless, the tone had been set and the Danish Protocol heralded the shift 
from organised crime to serious crime.
2.2.3 The post-Convention era
In the post-Convention era serious crime is without a doubt the dominant theme, 
superseding organised crime (dorn, 2009). The Commission took it one step further 
in its Proposal for a Europol Council Decision. The Council agreed (Council document 
10327/07 of 4.6.2007), disregarding the German Presidency Proposal to add the crite-
rion “when there are serious grounds to believe that these offences may be related to 
organised criminal activities” (Council document 7539/07 of 19.3.2007). The Europol 
Council Decision further extends Europol’s competence, as the existence of a criminal 
organised structure is no longer a limiting element. This would ease support provided 
by Europol to Member States in relation to criminal investigations where involvement 
of organised crime is not demonstrated from the start. Still, given the number of 
crimes (e.g. murder, grievous bodily harm, kidnapping…) that are more often com-
mitted outside an organised context, this is a significant change (peers, 2007). Now 
“serious crime” has superseded “organised crime”, Europol joins in with its judicial 
counterpart Eurojust, which has a general competence for serious crime, particularly 
when it is organised (Art. 3 (1) Eurojust Decision) (OJ L 63 of 6.3.2002) (brown, 2008). 
This enhances consistency within the third pillar (de moor & vermeulen, 2010).
All forms of serious crime that Europol is competent to deal with – other than organ-
ised crime and terrorism – are listed in the Annex to the Europol Council Decision. 
This list does not differ from the present enumeration. To join in with Eurojust, one 
would have expected “participation in a criminal organisation” to be considered as 
serious crime as well. Moreover, the offence “participation in a criminal organisation” 
also figures on the list of the 32 offences within the scope of the European arrest 
warrant (OJ L 190 of 18.7.2002), upon which the Commission Proposal was based. 
Remarkably enough, this means that Europol has competence over “organised crime” 
as form of crime, yet not over “participation in a criminal organisation” as criminal 
offence.
Now the extension of the competence of Europol has been covered, let us move 
to the definition of the competence of Europol (2.3), or rather the non-existence of 
definitions of Europol-crimes (2.3.1). We ask ourselves the question: What could fill the 
absence of definitions of Europol-crimes? (2.3.2).
2.3 Defining the competence of Europol
2.3.1 Problem identification
Although the Europol Convention defined the forms of crime, which Europol was ini-
tially competent to deal with (crime connected with nuclear and radioactive substances, 
illegal immigrant smuggling, trafficking in human beings, motor vehicle crime, illegal 
money laundering activities, unlawful drug trafficking), none of the forms of crime 
over which Europol subsequently gained competence have ever been defined. The 
Europol Council Decision does not remedy this shortcoming either. Instead the forms 
of crime are to be assessed by the competent national authorities in accordance with 
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the national law of the Member States to which they belong (Annex, in fine). This often 
leads to the result that the competence of Europol is being interpreted in different 
ways throughout the EU.
The Europol Information System (IS) (supra) is a painful illustration of the non-
existence of definitions of Europol-crimes. The IS provides a general information 
exchange service available to all Member States through their liaison officers and the 
national units. It is used to store personal information about people who, under the 
national law of that Member State, are suspected of having committed a crime for 
which Europol has competence, or where there are serious grounds to believe they will 
commit such crimes. It allows Member States to search what is in practice “a central 
EU repository for serious organised crime” (House of lords, 2008, p. 31). The IS is 
fed by input from the national units. Research has shown that officials responsible 
for the data transmission receive limited training on Europol’s sphere of competence 
and the functioning of the IS. If doubts arise as to the very scope of a Europol-crime, 
the national official can put a question to Europol; however this option is rarely used 
(de bondT & vermeulen, 2009). The consequences of the discretion of the Member 
States to assess the crimes within Europol’s competence in accordance with their 
national law are severe, as the same Europol-label (e.g. trafficking in human beings 
or any other of the Europol-crimes) has up to 27 possible different interpretations. We 
ask ourselves the question whether anyone knows what is actually in the IS.
2.3.2 Solution
What could fill the absence of definitions of Europol-crimes? Is there a solution? A 
careful analysis of legal and policy documents shows that there have been fruitless 
suggestions, originating both from within the Council and the European Parliament, 
to alter the situation.
The Swedish Presidency raised the issue whether definitions were needed for the 
forms of crime listed in the Annex (Council document 5555/01 of 22.1.2001). The 
Europol Convention (Article 43. 3) did allow the Council to – unanimously – add defi-
nitions to the Annex. It was not a matter of legal basis, but a matter of policy choice. 
The initial draft Council Decision of the Swedish Presidency extending Europol’s com-
petence to deal with all forms of crime listed in Annex, noted that this extension neces-
sitated the addition of definitions to the Annex. For every form of crime listed in the 
Annex the draft suggested definitions, although the Presidency was of the opinion that 
only those forms of crime should be defined where doubts could arise as to the limits 
of Europol’s competence. Where the drafters got their inspiration from is difficult to 
ascertain, but at least not from the early days of the harmonisation movement. The 
joint Belgo-Swedish initiative no longer featured definitions, to the dissatisfaction of 
Germany that kept calling for definitions to be drawn up and included in the Decision 
(Council documents 9093/2/01 of 5.9.2001; 14196/01 of 4.12.2001).
The European Parliament also proposed an interesting amendment in its 
November 2001 legislative resolution (OJ C 140/E of 13.6.2002). If the Council would 
adopt framework decisions determining the constituent elements of individual crimi-
nal offences these should replace the corresponding provisions of the (Annex to the) 
Europol Convention. Following justification is given in the Turco Report (European 
Parliament document A5-0370/2001 of 24.10.2001): “in order to maintain in the 
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Union a clear, uniform legal framework of definitions of criminal offences laid down 
at European level, the framework decisions adopted by the Council must replace the 
corresponding provisions of the Europol Convention and the annexes thereto”. This 
explicitly joins in with the harmonisation efforts that have been conducted in the third 
pillar, on the basis of Article 29 seq. TEU.
The Treaty of Amsterdam brought a new dimension to both police (supra) and judi-
cial cooperation in criminal matters. The debate on the need for common principles 
of substantive criminal law truly gathered momentum with the creation of the area of 
freedom, security and justice (de bondT & vermeulen, 2009). Article 29 TEU provides 
that this area of freedom, security and justice shall be achieved through closer police 
cooperation (supra), judicial cooperation and, where necessary, through approximation 
of rules on criminal matters in the Member States. According to Article 31. 1 (e) TEU, 
approximation shall be achieved by progressively adopting measures establishing 
minimum rules relating to the constituent elements of criminal acts and to penalties 
in the fields or organised crime, terrorism and illicit drug trafficking. Article 34. 2 (b) 
TEU finally provides that the Council may adopt framework decisions for the purpose 
of approximation of the laws and regulations of the Member States. Framework deci-
sions are binding upon the Member States as to the result to be achieved, but leaves 
to the national authorities the choice of form and methods, without entailing direct 
effect. Through the adoption of framework decisions the so-called ‘framework deci-
sion substantive criminal law’ came into being (vermeulen & de bondT, 2009).
The enumeration of the fields that should be subject of harmonisation was slightly 
deceptive, as the open-ended concept of ‘organised crime’ enabled the Union to streng-
hten its grip on practically all criminal law of the Member States (van der wilT, 2002). 
The 1998 Vienna Action Plan (OJ C 19 of 23.1.1999), the 1999 Tampere Presidency 
Conclusions (supra) and the 2000 Millennium Strategy (OJ C 124 of 3.5.2000) further 
extended the scope to trafficking in human beings, especially the exploitation of women 
and the sexual exploitation of children, drug offences, corruption, counterfeiting of the 
euro, tax fraud, computer fraud, terrorist offences, environmental crime, cyber crime, 
money laundering, as long as these offences are linked to organised crime, terrorism 
and/or drug trafficking (vermeulen, 2007). Research has nevertheless shown that the 
approximation process with regard to the constituent elements of criminal acts has 
extended way beyond the boundaries set by both the TEU and the principal EU policy 
documents (de bondT & vermeulen, 2009).
Did the forms of serious crime Europol is competent to deal with also become 
subject of harmonisation? Evidently. Between 2000 and 2008 Council framework deci-
sions covered following Europol-crimes (in chronological order):
•	 Forgery	 of	 money	 and	 means	 of	 payment:	 Council	 Framework	 Decision	 of	 29	
May 2000 on increasing protection by criminal penalties and other sanctions 
against counterfeiting in connection with the introduction of the euro (OJ L 140 of 
14.6.2000), as amended by Council Framework Decision of 6 December 2001 (OJ L 
329 of 14.12.2001); Council Framework Decision of 28 May 2001 combating fraud 
and counterfeiting of non-cash means of payment (OJ L 149 of 2.6.2001);
•	 Money	laundering:	Council	Framework	Decision	of	26	June	2001	on	money	laun-
dering, the identification, tracing, freezing, seizing and confiscation of instrumen-
talities and the proceeds of crime (OJ L 182 of 5.7.2001);
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•	 Terrorism:	 Council	 Framework	 Decision	 of	 13	 June	 2002	 on	 combating	 terror-
ism (OJ L 164 of 22.6.2001), as amended by Council Framework Decision of 28 
November 2008 (OJ L 330 of 9.12.2008);
•	 Trafficking	 in	 human	 beings:	 Council	 Framework	 Decision	 of	 19	 July	 2002	 on	
combating trafficking in human beings (OJ L 203 of 1.8.2002); Council Framework 
Decision of 22 December 2003 on combating the sexual exploitation of children and 
child pornography (OJ L 13 of 20.1.2004);
•	 Illegal	immigrant	smuggling:	Council	Framework	Decision	of	28	November	2002	
on the strengthening of the penal framework to prevent the facilitation of unauthor-
ized entry, transit and residence (OJ L 328 of 5.12.2002), complemented by Council 
Directive 2002/90/EC of 28 November 2002 defining the facilitation of unauthorised 
entry, transit and residence (OJ L 328 of 5.12.2002);
•	 Corruption:	Council	Framework	Decision	of	22	July	2003	on	combating	corruption	
in the private sector (OJ L 192 of 31.7.2003);
•	 Unlawful	 drug	 trafficking:	 Council	 Framework	 Decision	 2004/757/JHA	 of	 25	
October 2004 laying down minimum provisions on the constituent elements 
of criminal acts and penalties in the field of illicit drug trafficking (OJ L 335 of 
11.11.2004);
•	 Computer	crime:	Council	Framework	Decision	2005/222/JHA	of	24	February	2005	
on attacks against information systems (OJ L 69 of 16.3.2005);
•	 Organised	crime:	Council	Framework	Decision	2008/841/JHA	of	24	October	2008	
on the fight against organised crime (OJ L 300 of 11.11.2008)3;
•	 Racism	 and	 xenophobia:	 Council	 Framework	 Decision	 2008/913/JHA	 of	 28	
November 2008 on combating certain forms and expressions of racism and xeno-
phobia by means of criminal law (OJ L 328 of 6.12.2008).
These instruments offer harmonised minimum definitions for forms of crime both 
the Europol Convention and the Europol Council Decision leave (largely) undefined. 
The Europol Convention did define the forms of crime, within Europol’s initial com-
petence by reference to certain international or European legal instruments criminal-
ising the conduct in question. Its rationale lies in the fact that, unlike the authorities 
in the Member States, Europol does not work in the context of a national criminal 
justice system which has defined the conduct described. In this perspective reliance 
on a common binding instrument is a safe mechanism (Klip, 2009).
What was available as substantive criminal law acquis at the time of drafting was 
used in the Europol Convention. Illegal money-laundering activities, for example, 
means the criminal offences listed in Article 6 (1) to (3) of the 1990 Council of Europe 
Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from 
Crime (CETS no. 141, Strasbourg, 8.11.1990). Crime connected with nuclear and 
radioactive substances is defined with reference to United Nations (UN) and Euratom 
instruments. Where no common international or European ground could be found, 
the Europol Convention introduced its very own Europol-definitions (e.g. illegal immi-
grant smuggling, trafficking in human beings, motor vehicle crime), even though in 
the meantime some have been superseded and are no longer compatible with the new 
3 Europol has competence over ‘organised crime’ as form of crime, but not over ‘participation in a crimi-
nal organisation’ as criminal offence (supra). The 2008 Council Framework Decision precisely harmo-
nises offences relating to participation in a criminal organisation. 
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harmonised offence definitions. The Europol-definition of trafficking human beings 
for example is no longer consistent with the EU-definition (van briel, sneiJers, vereecKe 
& bosscHem, 2002). Unlawful drug trafficking is somewhat particular. Although part 
of Europol’s initial competence, it was only defined in 2003 by the Danish Protocol, 
with reference to the 1988 UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances (UNTS no. 27627, Vienna, 20.12.1988).
What was not yet available in the early days of Europol, is now there for the tak-
ing: an impressive acquis of JHA substantive criminal law, consisting of – but not 
limited to – framework decision substantive criminal law. There are also other EU 
instruments and even JHA non-EU instruments, for within EU context approxima-
tion is also pursued via other instruments, originating from the EU (conventions, first 
pillar instruments) and also from other cooperation levels (Council of Europe, United 
Nations) (vermeulen & de bondT, 2009). This would allow to define up to 80-90% of 
the Europol-crimes, without even having to reinvent the wheel. We argue that for-
mally recognising the readily available minimum definitions would not only be a safe 
mechanism for Europol, it would also be a coherent mechanism and a solution to the 
identified problem. It would in fact amount to another application of the subsidiarity 
principle, on top of the existing criterion that the crimes should justify a common 
approach owing to their scale, significance and consequences (supra).
When the minimum definitions for the Member States were to function as maxi-
mum definitions when shaping Europol’s competence, we figure this would draw a 
clear(er) line between national and Union level (See for an interesting discussion de 
HerT, 2004). The implementation of the framework decision substantive criminal law 
has brought a layered structure to national substantive criminal law (vermeulen & de 
bondT, 2009). Within national substantive criminal law provisions one can identify an 
EU inspired component (notably a framework decision component), complementing 
more national components. The EU inspired component has been jointly identified 
by all EU Member States, as framework decisions fall under the third pillar unanimity 
rule. If Europol were to become competent only for the top layer, this could para-
doxically strenghten its position. Less is in fact more. The national law enforcement 
authorities would of course remain competent for both the top and the bottom layer. 
Europol would remain the EU organisation supporting national law enforcement 
action, but only for the top layer. The competence over the top layer would thus not be 
exclusive but concurrent.
Using strict boundaries would facilitate the discussions to extend Europol’s powers, 
whether or not in the executive sense. We argue that the discussion on the definition 
of the Europol-crimes should be untangled from the question as to whether executive 
powers for Europol are desired, although in literature the former is seen as a prereq-
uisite for the latter (anderson et al., 1995; benyon et al. 1993; lavranos, 2003). Instead 
of talking in vain about executive powers, we believe there are more urgent matters. 
For example, Europol has to rely on the national units for its ‘feeding’. It is the task of 
the national units to supply Europol on their own initiative with the information and 
intelligence necessary for it to carry out its tasks (Article 4. 4, 1) Europol Convention). 
There is presently no right for Europol to claim information from the Member States. 
Perhaps if Europol’s competence was limited by agreed maximum definitions, such a 
right would be easier for the Member States to digest. In general, using strict bounda-
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ries would simplify the facilitation of exchange of information and the development of 
criminal intelligence. In other words, it would simplify Europol’s core business.
To conclude our first part we remind that Europol was not established to deal with 
local or minor offences, but to give a European dimension to the investigation of crime 
of a European dimension (Klip, 2009). Our suggestion would be for Europol to do 
this on the basis of offence definitions which also have a clear European dimension. 
To support our suggestion we turn the US, where the FBI provides an interesting 
perspective.
3 The Competence of Europol in Comparative Perspective
3.1  Introducing: the FBI
With a population of some 306 million people, all of whom are under the author-
ity of competing political jurisdictions at federal, state, county and local levels, law 
enforcement in the US reflects a structure more complex than in any other country 
(inciardi, 2007). The dominant tradition in American law enforcement is local control. 
This localised approach to law enforcement was inherited from England during the 
colonial period (walKer, 1992). As a result American policing is characterized by frag-
mentation, variety and above all decentralisation. That is, there is no national police 
force per se.
The US Constitution does not provide expressly for the establishment and main-
tenance of police services, nor does it prohibit such services. The implied powers of 
Clause 18 (infra) of Article I, Section 8, which provides for the common defence and for 
the promotion of the general welfare of the people, has been interpreted as enabling 
the federal government to establish federal law enforcement organisations. Therefore, 
the US Constitution is the basis for federal law enforcement. However, this is not to be 
confused with the concept of source, which is the act or instrument by which a specific 
law enforcement agency is created. The source of all federal law enforcement agencies 
is US Congress. It is Congress that enacts appropriate legislation for an agency’s crea-
tion and maintenance (waldron, 1976).
In the US there is no single federal agency responsible for the enforcement of all 
federal laws. There are approximately 50 federal law enforcement agencies. Most fed-
eral police agencies have limited powers and their investigative powers are narrow in 
scope. Federal law enforcement agencies can be found in the Departments of Justice, 
Treasury, State, Agriculture, Transportation, Interior, Transportation, Education and 
the US Post Office (ibbeTson & palmioTTo, 2006).
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is the primary law enforcement agency 
in the Department of Justice (Torres, 1985; doJ, 2009). The FBI gives as date of its 
founding 26 July 1908. Yet, the formation of what is now considered to be the elite 
law enforcement agency dates back to the late 19the century (deflem, 2006). When it 
needed agents to investigate violations of the few federal criminal statutes that existed, 
the Office of the Attorney General, created by Congress in 1789, borrowed Secret 
Service agents from the Treasury Department. In 1907 President Roosevelt requested 
Congress to create a new law enforcement agency in the Justice Department. When 
Congress opposed – out of fear of a ‘secret police’ – Roosevelt created the Bureau of 
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Investigation by executive order. Congress added the word ‘federal’ in 1935 (See for a 
brief history THeoHaris et al., 2000).
Many consider the FBI to be a general agency because its responsibilities extend 
into all major areas of federal criminal law. However, as an investigative agency, it does 
not bear the general peacekeeping, traffic control and social service functions that 
occupy much of the effort of general police agencies at state and local level (de feo, 
1994; walKer, 1992). In addition to the traditional law enforcement responsibilities, 
the FBI also has significant intelligence responsibilities (KoleTar, 2005; poveda, 2007). 
In literature – both European (verbruGGen, 1995) and American (viZZard, 2008) – 
it is seen as a problem that the FBI is a criminal law enforcement agency and an 
intelligence agency at the same time, reporting to both the Attorney General and the 
Director of National Intelligence. The traditional attitude of most countries is to give 
typical police tasks and intelligence functions to different agencies. The line between 
law enforcement and intelligence may not be a bright one, but nonetheless, they are 
distinct missions.
According to the FBI however, “History has shown that we are most effective in 
protecting the US when we perform these two missions in tandem” (FBI, 2004a, p. 
23). “By definition”, investigations of international terrorism would be both criminal 
and intelligence investigations. They are criminal investigations since international 
terrorism against the US constitutes a violation of the federal criminal code4. They are 
also intelligence investigations because their objective is “the detection and counter-
ing of international terrorist activities” and because they employ the investigative tools 
that are designed for the intelligence mission of protecting the US against attack or 
other harm by foreign entities. Although terrorism had gradually developed as an FBI 
priority (infra), the events of 11 September 2001 have launched a new phase in the 
FBI’s development (mueller, 2003). The US Patriot Act of 26 October 2001 removed 
the legal barriers between criminal and intelligence operations. The FBI formalised 
this merger by consolidating the separate case classifications for criminal international 
terrorism investigations and intelligence international terrorism investigations into a 
single classification (number 315) for international terrorism (FBI, 2008). The National 
Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) recently dismissed the division of the FBI 
into two agencies in a report entitled Transforming the FBI: Progress and Challenges 
(napa, 2005), although no supportive evidence was offered (viZZard, 2006). For 
example, no comparison was made between the US and the United Kingdom with 
its MI5 security service. Unlike US counterpart FBI, Europol is restricted to pure 
law enforcement. Whereas the FBI has full investigative powers, Europol has none, 
although the role of Europol in JITs (supra) could be seen as a foretaste of an executive 
European Police Office (de moor, 2009).
There is no Europol Convention-like ‘FBI Charter’ (ellerman, 2004). Federal law 
gives the FBI the authority to investigate all federal crime not assigned exclusively to 
another federal agency (US Code, Title 28, Chapter 33 – Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
Section 533; Code of Federal Regulations, Title 28, Subpart P – Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, Section 0.85). Additionally, there are laws such as the Congressional 
Assassination, Kidnapping and Assault Act (US Code, Title 18, Section 351) giving 
4 We note that there actually is no federal code worthy of the name (infra). We also note that there is no 
single federal law making terrorism a crime, although there are various executive orders, presidential 
decisions, directives and federal criminal statutes addressing the issue of terrorism. 
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the FBI responsibility to investigate specific crimes. The FBI has special investigative 
jurisdiction to investigate violations of state law in limited circumstances, specifi-
cally felony killings of state law enforcement officers (US Code, Title 28, Chapter 33, 
Section 540), violent crimes against interstate travellers (US Code, Title 28, Chapter 
33, Section 540A) and serial killings (US Code, Title 28, Chapter 33, Section 540B). 
A request by an appropriate state official is required before the FBI has the author-
ity to investigate these matters. The FBI also has authority to investigate threats to 
national security in accordance with Presidential executive orders, Attorney General 
guidelines and various statutory sources (See Executive Order 12333; US Code, Title 
50, Chapter 15 – National security, Sections 401 et seq. and Chapter 36 – Foreign 
intelligence surveillance, Sections 1801 et seq.). Threats to the national security are 
defined as: international terrorism, espionage and other intelligence activities, sabo-
tage and assassination, conducted by, for or on behalf of foreign powers, organisations 
or persons; foreign computer intrusion; and other matters determined by the Attorney 
General consistent with Executive Order 12333 or any successor order.
The FBI’s dual responsibility also shows from its current priorities. There are three 
national security priorities (counterterrorism, counterintelligence and cyber crime) 
and five criminal priorities (public corruption, civil rights, organised crime, white-
collar crime, violent crime). In 1998 the FBI established a five-year strategic plan to set 
investigative priorities in line with a three-tier structure. Tier 1 included those crimes 
or intelligence matters – including terrorism – that threaten national or economic 
security. Tier 2 included offences involving criminal enterprises, public corruption 
and violations of civil rights. Tier 3 included violations that affect individuals or pro-
perty. On 11 September 2001 the prevention of further terrorism became the Bureau’s 
dominant priority. In May 2002 this prioritisation was formalised by issuing a new 
hierarchy of programmatic priorities, with counterterrorism at the top. The current 
priorities were developed by evaluating each criminal and national security threat 
according to three factors: 1) significance of the threat to the security of the US, as 
expressed by the President in National Security Presidential Directive 26; 2) the prior-
ity the American public places on the threat and 3) the degree to which addressing the 
threat falls most exclusively falls within the competence of the FBI (FBI, 2004b). The 
FBI has 15 investigative programs corresponding to the 8 priorities and mirroring the 
competence of the FBI (infra). There are programs devoted to inter alia counterterror-
ism, counterintelligence, cyber crime, public corruption, civil rights, organised crime, 
violent gangs, white-collar crime, significant violent crime, fugitives, crimes against 
children, art crime, environmental crime (FBI, 2008a).
Next up, is the competence of the FBI (3.2). The FBI has a century of history as a 
criminal law enforcement agency (See FBI, 2008b). Initially, the competence of the 
FBI included only a limited number of criminal offences. Yet, the FBI would rapidly 
become the most important federal law enforcement organisation in the US, especially 
as the FBI was assigned to enforce new federal statutes. The extension of the compe-
tence of the FBI and the extension of federal criminal law go hand in hand. Before 
examining the federalisation of criminal law (3.2.2), we give some basic constitutional 
features of the US criminal justice system, or rather criminal justice systems (3.2.1). 
Mirroring the first part on Europol, we end by examining the extension (3.2.3) and the 
definition (3.2.4) of the competence of the FBI.
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3.2 The competence of the FBI
3.2.1  Basic constitutional features of the US criminal justice system
Since the US has a federal form of government, there are two criminal justice processes 
– that of the federal government and that of the 50 states (cole & smiTH, 2005). Looking 
from the outside, this appears to be a “pagaille de confusion” (blaKesley & curTis, 
1992, p. 334). The situation in the US is complicated by the fact that governmental 
power, including the power to create and enforce criminal law, is divided between two 
sets of sovereign powers: the federal government and the 50 states (lafave & scoTT, 
1986). It is a recognised constitutional principle, deeply rooted in the American crimi-
nal justice system, that the general police power resides in the states, not in the federal 
government (von meHren & murray, 2007). The careful constitutional limitation of the 
federal government’s power is part of a deliberate design. Historically, centralisation 
of criminal law (enforcement) power in the federal government has been perceived as 
creating potentially dangerous consequences and has therefore been avoided (ABA, 
1998).
The federal government only possesses those powers expressly or impliedly granted 
by the US Constitution (Tribe, 2000; cHoper, fallon, Kamisar & sHiffrin 2001). Only 
five clauses suggest express criminal law powers. One is treason (Article III, Section 
3, Clause 2). Counterfeiting is mentioned in Article I, Section 8 and so are piracy, the 
law of nations and military crimes. However, implied powers exist to establish crimes 
directly related to an express power (e.g. the power to regulate interstate commerce, to 
establish post offices, to tax, to prosecute war...) on the basis of the so-called ‘necessary 
and proper clause’: “The Congress shall have the power (…) To make all laws which 
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all 
other powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the United States, or in 
any department or officer thereof” (Article I, Section 8, Clause 18).
The states have reserved all other powers which the US Constitution does not 
expressly deny: “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, 
nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the peo-
ple” (Amendment X).
3.2.2 The federalisation of criminal law
The ‘federalisation’ of criminal law – that is Congress’ increasing fondness for mak-
ing federal crimes of offences that traditionally were matters left to the states – has 
been well documented and much lamented (o’sullivan, 2006). The American Bar 
Association (ABA) Task Force on the Federalization of Criminal Law issued a report in 
1998 that focused on – and criticised – Congress’ role in ‘federalising’ crime. It noted 
that the impetus for the increased federal presence did not appear to be grounded 
on considerations of respective federal and state competence: “New crimes are often 
enacted in patchwork response to newsworthy events, rather than as part of a cohesive 
code developed in response to an identifiable federal need” (ABA, 1998, p. 14). Scholars 
have recognised that a crime being considered for federalisation is often “regarded as 
appropriately federal because it’s serious and not because of any structural incapac-
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ity to deal with the problem on the part of state and local government” (ZimrinG & 
HawKins, 1996, p. 20).
Until the Civil War (1861-1865), only a small number of federal offences existed. 
Federal crimes were limited to those necessary to prevent injury to or interference 
with the federal government itself or its programs. After the Civil War, Congress 
expanded the scope of federal criminal jurisdiction to matters clearly within the police 
powers of the states (scHwarTZ, 1948; beale, 1995). In 1872 Congress included an 
antifraud provision in the codification of the postal laws. Although Congress could 
point to its constitutional power to establish post offices, the concept of ‘mail fraud’ as 
a federal crime marked the first serious trenching on state criminal jurisdiction. At the 
turn of the century, Congress discovered the interstate commerce clause as a basis for 
federal criminal jurisdiction (de feo, 1994), an important clause because it was also 
the major means to establish an economic union for free trade within the US. But it 
was misused (HuGHes, 1997). The power to regulate interstate commerce was given 
a very broad interpretation. In short, “it affects interstate commerce if Congress says 
it does” (HuGHes, 1997, p. 155). The ABA Task Force revealed a startling fact about 
the explosive growth of federal criminal law: more than 40% of the federal criminal 
provisions enacted since the Civil War have been enacted since 1970 (ABA, 1998).
Unlike the states, whose codifications of criminal law, modelled after the American 
Law Institute Model Penal Code, resemble in substance the national criminal codes 
in Europe (lensinG, 1993), the federal government has never had a true criminal code. 
The closest Congress has come to enacting a code, was the creation of Title 18 of the 
US Code5 in 1948 (o’sulllivan, 2006). A 19-year effort (from 1966 to 1984) to develop 
and enact a federal criminal code ultimately failed (JoosT, 1997). Title 18 is a compila-
tion, rather than a code and has been described as “an odd collection of two hundred 
years of ad hoc statutes, rather than a unified, interrelated, comprehensive criminal 
code” (rainer, 1989).
How many federal crimes are there at present? Getting an accurate count is not 
as simple as counting the number of federal statutes. As the 1998 ABA report stated: 
“So large is the present body of federal criminal law that there is no conveniently 
accessible, complete list of federal crimes” (p. 9). While a count of 3,000 federal crimes 
was made in 1989 (rainer), the ABA Task Force found this number outmoded by 1998 
(ABA). A Federalist Society study estimated in 2004 that there are more than 4,000 fed-
eral crimes, some 1,200 of which are jumbled together in Title 18, with the remainder 
scattered throughout the remaining 49 titles of the US Code (baKer & benneT, 2004).
3.2.3 Extending the competence of the FBI
Federal law gives the FBI the authority to investigate all federal crime not assigned 
exclusively to another federal agency (supra). The FBI is responsible for over 200 
categories of federal crime. Unfortunately, there is no list. The extension of the com-
petence of the FBI and the extension of federal criminal law go hand in hand, as the 
FBI was assigned to enforce the bulk of these new federal statutes (poveda, 2007). We 
illustrate this with the milestone extensions over the last 100 years.
5 The US Code is the codification by subject matter of the general and permanent laws of the US. It is 
divided by broad subjects into 50 Titles and published by the Office of the Law Revision Counsel of the 
US House of Representatives. Since 1926 the US Code has been published every six years. 
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The FBI started off in 1908 with competence over antitrust matters, land fraud, 
copyright violations, peonage and some 20 other matters. The 1910 White Slave Traffic 
Act (Mann Act) put responsibility for interstate prostitution under the Bureau (US 
Code, Title 18, Chapter 117, Section 2421). The 1919 National Motor Vehicle Theft 
Act (Dyer Act) did the same for interstate car theft (US Code, Title 18, Chapter 113, 
Section 2311). Unlike the Mann Act, the interstate transportation of stolen vehicles 
really was a vital part of the problem, because it made apprehension of the criminals 
and recovery of the vehicles much more difficult (bradley, 1984). A large number 
of federal statutes were adopted in the 1930s, none of which broke new theoretical 
ground, as the interstate commerce clause had become a well-established basis for 
federal criminal jurisdiction (beale, 1995). Bank robbery, extortion and robbery affect-
ing interstate commerce, interstate transmission of extortionate communications, 
interstate flight to avoid prosecution, interstate transportation of stolen property… 
What all these crimes had in common was an interstate nexus justifying federal 
intervention in general and FBI competence in particular. The 1934 Federal Fugitive 
Felon Act for example was only designed to provide a legal basis for FBI assistance 
in apprehending the fugitive (US Code, Title 18, Chapter 49, Section 1073) (scHwarZ, 
1948). During the same period Congress also enacted the Federal Kidnapping Act, in 
the commotion surrounding the kidnapping of the Lindbergh baby in 1932 (US Code, 
Title 18, Chapter 55, Section 1201) (finley, 1940).
After World War II, the FBI further intensified its position, as it became respon-
sible for the enforcement of hundreds of federal criminal statutes. In the 1950s civil 
rights violations and organised crime became matters of increasing concern. As in 
the past, lack of competence hindered the Bureau from responding to these problems 
(FBI, 2008a). It was under the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the 1965 Voting Rights Act 
that the Bureau received the authority to investigate many of the wrongs done to the 
African Americans in the South and elsewhere (Jeffreys-Jones, 2007). Under the exist-
ing laws the Bureau’s efforts against organised crime also started slowly. In the 1960s 
and 1970s Congress employed the power to regulate interstate commerce to tackle 
organised crime (See bradley, 1984). The first of these was the 1961 Travel Act (US 
Code, Title 18, Chapter 95, Section 1952) authorising federal criminal penalties for 
interstate travel intended to facilitate gambling, narcotic traffic, prostitution, extor-
tion and bribery – illegal activities frequently associated with organised crime. With 
the 1968 Consumer Credit Protection Act, Congress authorised criminal penalties 
for extortionate credit transactions (‘loan sharking’), providing a source of funds for 
organised crime (US Code, Title 18, Chapter 42, Section 891). Congress also enacted 
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) (Title IX of the 1970 
Organized Crime Control Act). ‘Racketeering activity’ is an example of a compound 
offence, i.e. an offence that defines the violation of existing federal and state offences 
as elements of a new federal offence (US Code Title 18, Chapter 96, Section 1961). It is 
striking to read that RICO has virtually never been used in a case, which was not reach-
able by other means (both federal and state) on the books prior to its passage (bradley, 
1984). Though RICO ultimately generated more cases, the loan sharking provisions 
broke new theoretical ground as Congress criminalised a whole class of activity (loan 
sharking) based upon a finding that the class of activity ‘affected’ interstate commerce 
(beale, 1995). The Controlled Substances Act, a comprehensive federal drug control 
statute, was enacted in 1970 on the basis of a similar finding. Moreover, Congress 
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noted that the possession and improper use of controlled substances also had “a sub-
stantial and detrimental effect upon the health and general welfare of the American 
people” (US Code, Title 21, Chapter 13 – Drug abuse prevention and control). Every 
drug crime that was an offence under state law could now also be tackled federally 
(scoTT wallace, 1993). The FBI however was not given the lead when it comes to the 
enforcement of federal drug laws. For years the FBI resisted pressure from Congress 
and the Justice Department and only became involved in drug enforcement in the 
early 1980s (verbruGGen, 1995). The FBI has concurrent jurisdiction with the Drug 
Enforcement Administration (DEA), another agency within the Department of Justice 
(Code of Federal Regulations, Title 28, Subpart P – Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
Section 0.85). The DEA is a single mission agency, dedicated to the enforcement 
of federal drug laws and policies (See DEA, 2003). The rivalry between the DEA 
and the FBI is legendary. At present the FBI acknowledges that the DEA is the US 
Government’s primary investigative agency to combat drug trafficking. The FBI also 
has an important role to play, but seeks to complement DEA’s efforts through an inte-
grated approach (FBI, 2004b). The 1980s and 1990s brought increased public concern 
with violent crime and Congress responded with the enactment of a number of new 
federal offences, such as carjacking and new firearms offences.
Enactment of each new federal crime conferred new federal investigative powers 
on federal agencies, notably on the FBI. Unlike Europol, dealing with a relatively long 
list of crimes as from 2001 already, the FBI was set up with a very limited number of 
offences it could investigate. Compared to Europol, there has been a gradual, rather 
than an exponential increase in the competence of the FBI over the past 100 years. The 
FBI has never taken the lead in drug enforcement, whereas drug trafficking provided 
the primary rationale for Europol during the pre-Convention era. In the Convention 
era this rationale was superseded by the notion ‘organised crime’. The extension of 
the competence of the FBI, as a correlate to the extension of federal criminal law, was 
carried out on the basis of interstate commerce, a notion as eroded as organised crime. 
The question we raised with regard to the extension of Europol’s competence, whether 
there was a genuine ‘need’ to do so, also proved to be a source of concern as to the 
extension of the competence of the FBI.
3.2.4 Defining the competence of the FBI
The reason for putting Europol in comparative perspective in the first place is to find 
support for our suggestion to shape to competence of Europol on the basis of offence 
definitions which have a clear European dimension, instead of leaving it up to the 
Member States in accordance with national law (supra). How is the competence of the 
FBI defined? is the main question of our second part. Our research hypothesis is that 
federal notions and definitions, emanating ‘federal competence worthiness’, shape 
this competence. We look beyond the obvious fact that the US has a federal form of 
government and that the EU can at the most be termed ‘quasi-federal’ (See scHmidT, 
2006; menon & scHain, 2006). Content-wise the resemblances are far greater, which 
makes we are not comparing apples and oranges. Today one can no longer maintain 
that criminal law in the EU is solely matter of national sovereignty (Tadiç, 2002). The 
Treaty of Amsterdam has drastically increased the influence of the EU on internal 
decision-making and room for autonomy of Member States concerning co-operation 
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in criminal matters, notably the approximation process with regard to the constituent 
elements of criminal acts with a European dimension (supra).
Federal notions and definitions indeed shape the competence of the FBI. As men-
tioned earlier, the source of all federal law enforcement agencies, including the FBI, 
is Congress. Federal law gives the FBI the authority to investigate all federal crime 
not assigned exclusively to another federal agency. The source of federal substantive 
criminal law is Congress as wel. Federal crimes, scattered throughout the US Code, 
are distinct from neatly codified state crimes, at least for their enactment and their 
enforcement. However, we have demonstrated that the substance of federal criminal 
law has come to duplicate much of state criminal law. Therefore, the boundaries 
between the federal top layer and the state bottom layer are not as strict as they would 
seem.
Federal substantive criminal law also presupposes ‘federal competence worthi-
ness’. The erosion of the commerce clause, makes that this may not be the case for all 
4,000 federal crimes. It is even particularly hard to find important offences because 
they are surrounded by trivial ones (JoosT, 1997). Also within the competence of the 
FBI there are more significant crimes and less significant crimes in terms of serious-
ness (sHapiro, 1995). Misuse of ‘Smokey Bear’, the mascot of the US Forest Service, 
is a federal crime, for example (US Code, Title 18, Chapter 33, Section 711). The same 
goes for the crime of interstate transportation of a defective refrigerator (US Code, 
Title 15, Chapter 26, Section 1211). In both cases the FBI is competent. Nevertheless, 
this does not alter the fact that the FBI, being a federal law enforcement organisation, 
enforces federal criminal law. The enforcement of state law is left to state law enforce-
ment agencies. In practice, most criminal conduct has always been – and still is – 
defined by state law, investigated by state agents, prosecuted by state prosecutors, tried 
in state courts and punished in state prisons. Federal law enforcement for criminal 
activity essentially local in character should generally not be undertaken. Translated 
into ‘Eurospeak’ this almost amounts to an application of the principle of subsidiarity. 
Subsidiarity is already the guiding principle for Europol and is ‘revamped’ in our sug-
gestion (supra).
4 Conclusion
In two parts we elaborated on the overall-question: How to shape the competence of 
Europol? We devoted the first part of our contribution to the competence of Europol. 
We introduced Europol as the EU law enforcement organisation handling criminal 
intelligence and identified three ‘eras’ for further analysis: the pre-Convention era, the 
Convention era and the post-Convention era. We analysed the extension of the compe-
tence of Europol. Our main questions were: Was there a trigger to extend the competence 
of Europol time and again? Was there a genuine ‘need’ to do so? Drug trafficking provided 
the main rationale for Europol in the pre-Convention era. The EDU, which formed the 
nucleus of Europol, kicked off with competence for illicit drug trafficking. However, it 
was envisaged from the outset that Europol would not be a single mission agency. In 
anticipation of a Europol Convention, Europol’s initial competence was extended from 
one area to four – adding illegal trade in radioactive and nuclear materials, crimes 
involving clandestine immigration networks, illegal vehicle trafficking – without 
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any reference to the European or national parliaments and without any motivation 
whatsoever. The extension to trafficking in human beings was prompted by a domes-
tic scandal, rather than responding to an identifiable need. In the Convention era, 
organised crime became the primary rationale for Europol. The list of crimes capable 
of being brought within the competence of Europol was expanded greatly between the 
initial drafts and the final text of the Europol Convention. The Europol Convention 
had established an order of priority which was disturbed at a number of occasions 
(terrorism, forgery of money and means of payment, money laundering). Instead of a 
further incremental extension of Europol’s competence, the entire Annex, including 
18 other serious forms of international crime, was brought within Europol’s sphere 
of competence. Halfway the Convention era the list of Europol-crimes had taken its 
final form. However, there remained room for manoeuvre. In the Europol Council 
Decision the existence of an organised criminal structure is no longer a limiting 
element. This makes that in the post-Convention era serious crime is the dominant 
theme, superseding organised crime.
Although the Europol-Convention defined the forms of crime, which Europol was 
initially competent to deal with, none of the forms of crime over which Europol sub-
sequently gained competence have ever been defined. Instead the forms of crime are 
to be assessed by the competent national authorities in accordance with the national 
law of the Member States to which they belong. The non-existence of definitions of 
Europol-crimes leads to the result that the competence of Europol is being interpreted 
in different ways throughout the EU. The Europol Information System is a painful 
illustration, as the same Europol-label has up to 27 possible different interpretations. 
We asked ourselves the question: What could fill the absence of definitions of Europol-
crimes? A careful analysis of legal and policy documents showed that there have been 
fruitless suggestions, both from within the Council and the European Parliament, to 
alter the situation. The European Parliament explicitly joins in with the harmonisa-
tion efforts that have been conducted in the third pillar, on the basis of Art. 29 seq. 
TEU. We endorsed this suggestion. We demonstrated how the forms of serious crime 
Europol is competent to deal with also became subject of harmonisation, through 
the adoption of framework decisions. These instruments offer harmonised minimum 
definitions for forms of crime both the Europol Convention and the Europol Council 
Decision leave (largely) undefined. What was not yet available in the early days of 
Europol, is now there for the taking: an impressive acquis of JHA substantive criminal 
law, consisting of – but not limited to – framework decision substantive criminal law, 
allowing to define up to 80-90% of the Europol-crimes. We argued for the sake of 
coherence to formally recognise the readily available minimum definitions. When the 
minimum definitions for the Member States were to function as maximum definitions 
when shaping Europol’s competence, we showed how this would draw a clear(er) line 
between national and Union level, although Europol’s competence over the top layer 
of substantive criminal law with a clear EU dimension would not be exclusive but con-
current. In general, using strict boundaries would simplify Europol’s core business 
(information-related tasks). It would also facilitate the discussions to extend Europol’s 
powers, whether or not in the executive sense.
To support our thesis we turned to the US, where the FBI provided an interesting 
perspective. We introduced the FBI, with its dual responsibility for law enforcement 
and national security. Then we dealt with the competence of the FBI. The FBI has a 
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century of history as a criminal law enforcement organisation and is responsible for 
more than 200 categories of federal crime. We gave some basic constitutional features 
of the US criminal justice system. We illustrated how the extension of federal criminal 
law and the extension of the competence of the FBI went hand in hand. The question 
we raised with regard to the extension of Europol’s competence, whether there was a 
genuine ‘need’ to do so, also proved to be a source of concern as to the gradual rather 
than exponential increase in the competence of the FBI. How is the competence of the 
FBI defined? was the main question of the second, comparative part of our contribution. 
We looked beyond the obvious fact that the US has a federal form of government and 
that the EU can at the most be termed ‘quasi-federal’. Content-wise the resemblances 
are far greater. We were largely confirmed in our views that federal notions and defini-
tions, emanating ‘federal competence worthiness’ shape the competence of the FBI. 
Ergo, we were provided with yet another argument to also use European notions and 
definitions, emanating a ‘Europol competence worthiness’, to shape the competence 
of Europol. This would make all the more sense in the light of Europol’s change of 
status from intergovernmental organisation to Community agency as from 2010.
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